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COMMENTARY
Environmental Inequities--Observations on
Mandelker's Environment and Equity-A
Regulatory Challenge
Douglas W. Kmiec*
In recent years, numerous commentators have asserted the im-
portance of protecting the environment. Professor Sax argued that
environmental protection was a "public right," yet neglected to ex-
plain who constituted the public.' Professor Stone found it inappro-
priate to protect the environment on the basis of human desires.
Instead, he sought to confer certain rights, particularly legal stand-
ing, directly on trees, mountains, rivers and other parts of our na-
tional landscape. 2 Professor Stone assumed that if trees and
mountains could talk, they would want to be preserved and repre-
sented by groups like the Sierra Club. Others pointed out that trees
could just as easily be construed as yearning for the fireplace as for
the forest.3 After all, might not the Sierra Nevadas prefer a Disney
ski resort and communing with Mickey Mouse to being left alone?4
© 1981 Douglas W. Kmiec.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. B.A., Northwestern University,
1973; J.D., University of Southern California, 1976. Member, Illinois and California Bars.
1 Sax, Takings, Pr'vate Properly and Pub/ic Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). Professor Sax
indicated that the need to protect public rights precludes compensation except where the
land use being regulated has no conflict-creating spillover effects. Since virtually every land
use creates spillovers, little compensation is required under the theory.
2 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TozwardLegal Rightsfor Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL L.
REV. 450 (1972).
3 Professor Sagoff writes:
Environmentalists always assume that the interests of these objects are opposed to
development. How do they know this? Why wouldn't Mineral King want to host a
ski resort, after doing nothing for a billion years? . ..The Sequoia National For-
est tells the developer that it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity of its hills and
snowiness during the winter. ... The seashore, meanwhile, indicates its willing-
ness to entertain poor people from Oakland by becoming covered with the great
quantities of sand. Finally, it is reasonable to think that Old Man River might do
something for change, like make electricity, and not just keep on rolling along. It is
an incredible optimism which assumes the guardians appointed to represent nature
would take an environmentalist position.
Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 222 (1974).
4 The Mineral King Valley faced this choice in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
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The point, of course, is that environmental writers assume, without
further justification, the need for environmental protection and fail
to identify the interests served or the sacrifices required.
In Environment and Equity-A Regulatory Challenge, Professor
Daniel R. Mandelker departs from the path chosen by these and
other environmental advocates by frankly identifying his interest in
the environment as a subjective value preference.5 It is not only a
preference, but a value which, according to Professor Mandelker,
should be accorded absolute protection against more mundane inter-
ests in energy, housing, industrial productivity and employment.6
Regrettably, those of us who value jobs and warm homes in the win-
ter might take issue with Professor Mandelker. More importantly,
his value preference is not a persuasive justification for forfeiting the
individual liberty, economic efficiency and production, and at the
extreme, the democratic processes to which we have become accus-
tomed. 7 While Professor Mandelker may recognize some of these
possible consequences, his sketchy exposition of the "equity" aspects
implicit in environmental conflicts suggests that he may not be fully
aware of the results of his advocacy.
I. A Comparison of Traditional and Environmental
Land Use Controls
The initial portion of Professor Mandelker's work attempts to
distinguish traditional land use controls from environmental land use
regulation.8 The distinction, as it turns out, is anything but sharp.
Professor Mandelker defines environmental land use controls as
"coastal management programs, environmental impact statement re-
quirements that affect land development, and little-known state con-
stitutional provisions regarding environmental quality that can also
(1972). See generally Lundmark, Mester, Cordes & Sandals, Mineral Kfig Goes Downhill, 5
ECOLOGY L.Q. 555 (1976).
5 D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE at xi
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENT].
6 As the final pages of this review suggest, it is not totally clear that Professor Mandelker
personally adopts this absolute position. Nevertheless, he suggests that: "The new environ-
mental controls require subjective value judgments that givepn'0rt'ty to environmental protec-
tion." ENVIRONMENT at xi (emphasis added). He later adds: "Environmentalists reject
marginal analysis. They impose absolute limits on land use to protect environmental benefits
whether or not the marginal gains of these restrictions exceed their costs. . . . The absolute
values that underlie the environmental ethic have deep roots in American tradition." Id. at
22-23.
7 Professor Mandelker recognizes that a centralized form of government more easily
accommodates an absolute environmental preference. ENVIRONMENT at 155.
8 See ENVIRONMENT, ch. 1.
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affect land use." 9 Environmental land use controls, as distinguished
from traditional land use controls, are portrayed as subjective, non-
localized, inter-generational claims to a fundamental environmental
right. Yet traditional land use controls possess most of these same
characteristics. For example, local zoning invariably reflects subjec-
tive values. That zoning is premised upon an exercise of state or lo-
cal police power does not give it an objective base. Traditional land
use practice indicates that so long as regulation can be justified by
some real or imagined general welfare purpose, it is presumed
valid. 10 As a result, zoning has been used to do everything from pro-
moting homogeneous development"I (single family uber alles) to im-
peding challenges from unwanted competitors 12 (the central business
district vs. the suburban shopping center). Thus, courts have upheld
enormously restrictive density, use and aesthetic controls without any
meaningfully objective health or safety justification. Since Professor
Mandelker admits that environmental land use regulation is by its
nature subjective, it should coexist easily with other land use con-
trols. Yet it is not coexistence that Professor Mandelker seeks for the
environment, but supremacy.
Do the other characteristics of environmental land use claims-
nonlocal, intergenerational, and fundamental--distinguish them
from the run-of-the-mill land use question? At first glance, the sug-
gestion that environmental problems are nonlocal merely echoes the
little disputed fact that such problems often originate with inefficien-
cies surrounding the use of some commonly owned resource, such as
air, water or public land. That is, rational, economic decisionmaking
fails to properly allocate common resources because the costs and
benefits associated with their use are widespread and incapable of
internalization. 13
9 ENVIRONMENT at xi.
10 Professor Ellickson remarks that "the Supreme Court has itself abandoned the ortho-
dox quartet" (the promotion of health, safety, morals or general welfare) by which zoning
decisions were initially measured. R. ELLIcKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS
81 (1981).
11 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), zoning was held con-
stitutional. Justice Sutherland characterized an apartment house, hardly a noxious, danger-
ous or immoral use of land, as "a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the
open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others. . . ." Id. at 394.
12 Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137
Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969).
See general45 Weaver & Duerksen, Central Buiness District Planning and the Control of Outying
Shopping Centers, 14 URB. L. ANN. 57 (1977).
13 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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What is novel about Professor Mandelker's theory is the ascrip-
tion of these common resource inefficiencies to some-but not all-
privately-owned resources. For example, Professor Mandelker com-
pares the regulation of privately-owned inland and coastal property.
With inland property, he suggests that a traditional land use control,
like zoning, is implemented after weighing the cost of any regulation
restricting development to the landowner against the benefits re-
ceived by adjacent landowners. However, with coastal property,
Mandelker argues that the cost of the regulation must be weighed
against "benefits [which] are diffused over a wide public."' 14 Thus, he
concludes that since the benefits from coastal property are nonlocal,
the regulation of private coastal property must necessarily be differ-
ent from regulation of other private property.
Instead of supporting the need for separate treatment of envi-
ronmental land use regulation, this analysis exposes the weak founda-
tion of all public use regulation of privately-owned land. If
traditional land use controls merely settle disputes among proximate
neighbors, private bargaining might easily do as well or better, as
Professor Mandelker virtually admits. 15 Where bargaining fails to
reach an optimum result because of transaction costs, inadequate
knowledge, moral incentives or unequal bargaining resources, 16 nui-
14 ENVIRONMENT at 39.
15 In commenting upon the harm-benefit theory associated with the taking clause, Pro-
fessor Mandelker admits that a land use control that deals with side-by-side conflicts involves
matters that "Coase type of bargaining can manage. Like bargaining, . . . governmental
regulation of side-by-side conflicts. . . leads to gains in trade. Zoning is an example." ENVI-
RONMENT at 40. While Professor Mandelker does not subscribe to the harm-benefit theory,
itself, because of the absence of a well-defined normalcy standard, his comments suggest that
bargaining can handle the regulation of side-by-side conflicts.
16 While he may accept bargaining for the resolution of side-by-side conflicts, Professor
Mandelker does not do so for environmental controversies. In this regard, Professor
Mandelker reiterated the standard criticisms of Coasean analysis by suggesting that bargain-
ing may result in undesirable distributive consequences or may not occur at all because of
unequal bargaining ability or because the perceived benefits are so widespread that high
transaction costs prevent bargaining. ENVIRONMENT at 10-13.
Professor Mandelker might have extended his criticism of Coasean bargaining to include
Coase's failure to observe that shifts in legal entitlements also alter the wealth of the affected
parties, thereby influencing how much the parties value particular entitlements. Conse-
quently, Coase probably errs in suggesting that shifting legal entitlements does not affect the
allocation of resources or the optimal result. See Demsetz, Wealth Distribution andthe Ownership
of(Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 228 (1972); Kelman, Consumption Theo,7, Production Theofy, and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979).
Although Coase assumed zero transaction costs, these costs, especially in environmental
cases, are significant. For example, the cost of obtaining information, organizing affected
parties, and negotiating an appropriate settlement are believed to be extremely high where
benefits and costs are dispersed. However, the presence of transaction costs does not suggest
[December 1981]
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sance remedies can be pursued, obviating the need for public regula-
tion. However, Professor Mandelker's characterization of
conventional land use controls conflicts with commonly accepted
land use doctrine. As noted earlier, zoning and other traditional
land use controls are purportedly enacted to further the "general
welfare," rather than to settle side-by-side or localized conflicts. 17 In
presuming zoning valid, courts assume that the legislature has con-
sidered the benefits to the entire community which accrue from regu-
lation. 8 Consequently, unless Professor Mandelker is willing to
abandon the public purpose facade of traditional land use controls,19
it would be specious to suggest that environmental land use regula-
tion is somehow less local or of greater public benefit.
Neither can the purpose of conventional land use control be con-
strued as less important to future generations than that of their envi-
ronmental counterparts. Indeed, that land use decisions have long-
in itself that government intervention is preferable to either nuisance remedies or leaving
market imperfections where they fall. Government intervention may be both unfair and inef-
ficient. See generally Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
218, 219-21. (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978).
17 That conventional land use controls like zoning were designed to apply to broad based
areas can be gleaned from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, promulgated by the
Department of Commerce in 1922, the model for many zoning ordinances. The Act provided
for a few zone classifications with large quantities of land within each zone. With the excep-
tion of single family zones, zones were cumulative. Zoning architects believe that virtually
any use could be accommodated within an existing zoning map. At most, the zoning archi-
tects thought that they could handle extraordinary cases or cases of particular hardship with
a minimum of legislative or administrative discretion by a rare zone amendment or variance.
Thus, zoning was designed not to resolve specific, localized conflicts, but as a self-administer-
ing system. See Krasnowiecki, A Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theo,7 and
Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 63 (1963); Krasnowiecki, The Basic S$ stem of
Land Use ControL" Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE NEW ZONING: LE-
GAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 3 (N. Marcus & M.
Groves eds. 1970).
18 See, e.g., Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d
290, 300-01 (1970) (where the evidence is debatable, the presumption of validity requires a
trial judge to render judgment in favor of the regulating government).
19 To some extent those courts which have found individual parcel rezonings to be an
administrative, quasi-judicial determination, rather than a legislative one have abandoned
this public purpose facade. See, e.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975);
City of Colorado Springs v. District Court 184 Col. 177,519 P.2d 325 (1974); Fasano v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42
N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956).
In addition, some scholars have determined that public land use control merely confirms
the wishes of neighboring residents rather than implementing generalized policies. See R.
NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1977); Kniec, Private Control of Collective Property
Rights (reviewing R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS), 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 589
(1979). See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
Crrv 206-08 (1968).
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term effects upon a community is often cited as a principal reason for
public regulation and planning.20 Housing constructed today will re-
quire an expansion of schools, roads, sewers and utility systems to-
morrow. Moreover, once a particular land use pattern is established,
transition to some other development form is difficult and expensive.
In addition, those who enact conventional and environmental land
use controls for the benefit of future generations share the common
shortcoming of simply not knowing the future. Although John
Rawls' hypothetical "veil of ignorance" provides a mechanism for
the formulation of a just savings schedule across generations, 21 the
problems in application are enormous. 22 Furthermore, some may
dispute the moral23 and economic justifications for incurring present
costs for future benefits in the face of immediate problems such as
starvation, illiteracy and inadequate housing. Nevertheless, even as-
suming intergenerational considerations are ascertainable and appro-
priate, Professor Mandelker again fails to illustrate how the
intergenerational effects of environmental land use decisions differ
from those same effects in traditional land use decisions.
We are left, then, with the assertion that environmental land use
claims are more fundamental than other land use claims. If environ-
mental claims are fundamental or absolute, they are distinguishable
from traditional land use questions which are not generally so char-
acterized. A traditional land use control is presumed valid, but the
presumption is rebutted upon a showing that the regulation: was
enacted contrary to statutory authority; has no rational basis; has
20 That planning and land use regulation is future oriented is reflected in § 7 of the
Standard City Planning Enabling Act, which states:
The plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a
coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality and its
environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs best promote
health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare ....
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT, tit. I, § 7 (rev. ed.
1928) (emphasis added). Professor Hagman describes conventional land use planning as 'y-
lure oriented: . . . establish[ing] ends, goals, or objectives which have not yet been reached."
D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 1 (1971).
21 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971).
22 For example, if the discount rate applicable in the market is applied to the interest of
future generations, future interests would invariably lose to present claims. See 0.
HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 204-21 (1974).
23 According to St. Matthew: "Take therefore no thought for the morrow; for the mor-
row shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."
Matthew 6:34. But cf. J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature 78-80 (1974), reprintedin
R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 176 (2d ed. 1978) (even
though it may be possible to rectify dissipation of natural resources through any current ef-
fort, it is nevertheless justifiable to be concerned about the future generations).
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been applied in an irrational manner; or deprives a landowner of all
reasonable use of his property.24 Admittedly, these standards are al-
most impossible to meet in many jurisdictions.25 Yet their existence
suggests the possibility of circumstances under which a given public
land use policy might not be carried out because it contravenes some
more fundamental, often constitutional, requirement. Thus, for en-
vironmental land use controls to be deemed fundamental, they must
originate from principles superior or equal to these constitutional
constraints.
Western jurisprudence suggests that absolute environmental
land use values do not originate with natural law. For example, one
commentator has noted:
Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthro-
pocentric religion the world has seen. . . . Man shares, in great
measure, God's transcendence of nature. Christianity, in absolute
contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions. . . not only es-
tablished a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is
God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends.26
Nor are environmental values accorded absolute protection by the
Constitution, as Professor Mandelker admits. 27 Surprisingly, Profes-
sor Mandelker expends little, if any, effort attempting to justify envi-
ronmental values as fundamental under the Constitution.
Theoretically, some justification might be extracted from the ninth
or fifth amendments. 28 Although the judicial standard for character-
izing a particular right as fundamental remains vague,2 9 Mandelker's
failure to address the task makes the fundamental quality of environ-
mental land use controls a matter of assertion.
Mere assertion is not sufficient. For the Supreme Court of the
United States even to comemplate characterizing environmental val-
ues as part of the liberty protected by the fifth amendment or as one
of the unenumerated rights retained by the people under the ninth
amendment, environmental rights must be compared with those
24 Seegeneral'y R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 62-63 (1981).
25 Id. at 75-76.
26 White, The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203, 1205 (1967).
27 ENVIRONMENT at 26.
28 Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 20, 108 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
29 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Harlan suggested that to find
that a right is constitutionally fundamental one must examine: "[T]he teachings of history,
... the basic values that underlie our society, and ... the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms." Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 57:313]
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presently deemed fundamental by the Court. Because the Court has
chosen to elevate civil, but not economic, liberties,30 the environmen-
talists must explain why the environment is more like the former,
rather than the latter.
Preliminary study suggests that the task of elevating environ-
mental rights to a fundamental status under the constitution will be
formidable. Civil liberties have been afforded greater protection
than economic liberties on the assumption that they serve a more
integral function in one's life and in the American system. While this
assumption can be challenged by pointing out the interwined nature
of political and economic freedoms, 31 the Court has shown little incli-
nation to return to the intent of the framers or the substance of the
Constitution where property and economic rights are concerned.32 A
Court which disregards express constitutional provisions protecting
economic rights is unlikely to afford that protection to the environ-
ment on the basis of an implication. Thus, one writer has concluded
that there is little to "offer a persuasive case for placing environmen-
tal rights in the same category as personal or individual rights with
respect to the appropriateness of resurrecting the due process ap-
proach abandoned in the case of economic rights. '3 3 The same au-
30 See B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
31 See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);
Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 355 (1978); Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights.: Balance and Conflict, 62
A.B.A.J. 77 (1976); Horowitz, Transformation and the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-
1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248 (1973); Pilon, Ordering Rights Consistenty: Or What We Do and Do
Not Have Rights To, 13 GA. L. REV. 1171 (1979); Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating
Corporate People Jnst~, 13 GA. L. REV. 1244 (1979); Powell, The Relationship Between Property
Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS LJ. 135 (1963).
32 Professor Siegan has argued that the framers expected the judiciary to exercise judicial
review in matters involving civil liberties primarily to protect property and other economic
rights from majoritarian invasion. By ignoring or misinterpreting certain express provisions
of the constitution, current Supreme Court doctrine adversely affects a large number of peo-
ple for whom the opportunity to engage freely in a business, trade or profession is the most
important liberty. Specifically, Professor Siegan points to Article I, § 10 of the Constitution
which prohibits a state from passing expostfacto laws or impairing the obligation of contracts.
In addition, the fourteenth amendment's due process clause in the 19th century was believed
to "prevent the State from doing that which will operate" as a deprivation of the right to
private property. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877). Also, Siegan indicates that
"[f]rom the ratification of the Constitution through approximately the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, [economic interests] might have had the benefit of natural rights-social
compact doctrines employed by the United States Supreme Court to strike down state legisla-
tion that deprived individuals of property interests." B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1980).
33 Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 20, 112 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
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thor speculates, however, that a better case for judicial intervention
might be made where an irreplaceable or unique environmental asset
was at stake. 34 It would have been nice had an environmental advo-
cate like Professor Mandelker made that case instead of relying upon
his unexplored, and seemingly unchallengeable, subjective value
preference to enshrine environmental protection as a fundamental
right.
II. Equitable Conflicts with Environmental Protection
Even if one were to accept without question Professor
Mandelker's assertions that environmental land use regulation differs
from traditional land use controls and involves a fundamental right,
his treatment of the equity issues raised by those assertions is unsatis-
factory. First, Professor Mandelker identifies only two of the many
consequences which follow from affording the environment absolute
protection: (a) a decrease in the availability of housing for low and
moderate income families and (b) the economic loss suffered by vari-
ous landowners forced to donate their property as an environmental
amenity without compensation. Virtually nothing is said about the
food, clothing, energy and other consumer goods which will not be
produced in order to protect the environment absolutely. The re-
lated losses in employment also go without serious attention. In
short, Professor Mandelker appears oblivious to the opportunity costs
associated with his proposal.3 5 Professor M. Bruce Johnson has ar-
ticulated the consequences of such an oversight.
34 Id. at 112-13.
35 For a discussion of the opportunity costs associated with environmental protection, see
Davis & Kamien, Externalities and The Quality of Air and Water, in ECONOMICS OF AIR AND
WATER POLLUTION 12-19 (W. Walker ed. 1969). With reference to this issue, Professor Bruce
Johnson has stated:
It should be obvious to all that environmental goods and services must come at the
expense of both other private goods and services and other public goods. Given the
finite resources and the available technology in any one period of time, a better
environment (public goods) must come at the expense of something else (private
and other public goods).
Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Dicussion of Land Use Regulation Without Compensation, in
PLANNING WITHOUT PRICEs 63, 87-88 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
By ignoring the opportunity costs associated with absolute environmental protection,
Professor Mandelker fails to answer clearly two questions: what quantity of environmental or
public goods should be produced? and how should these public goods be produced? With
respect to the first question, according environmental values an absolute status overlooks.the
absence of any generally acceptable way of directly comparing the well-being of various indi-
viduals, and the resulting lack of a utility function which applies to society as a whole. See K.
ARROW, THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1951). Cf Sagoff, Economic Theory andEnvironmen-
[Vol. 57:3131
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[R]egulation without compensation will lead to over-production of
environmental amenities .. .to the point where the bureaucrats'
subjective valuation of the last unit is equal to its perceived zero
cost. Free from the discipline of consumer demand via markets and
the constraint of cost via compensation and budgets, central control
of land use decisions degenerates to the planning without prices.
36
A. Housing Production and the Environment
Since the distortion of the economic system and the oversupply
of public goods is ignored by Professor Mandelker, let us turn our
attention to one problem which he does acknowledge-the undersup-
ply of low income housing caused by environmental regulation favor-
ing open space and preservation. Again, Professor Mandelker's focus
on this problem of distributional equity is extremely narrow since
protecting the environment absolutely redistributes wealth from
lower to upper-income groups not just with respect to housing, but
generally. The existing empirical evidence suggests that "environ-
mental amenities are, from the viewpoint of economic analysis, lux-
ury goods for the affluent."' 37 An absolute preference for
environmental quality must include the cost to various income
groups of all foregone economic activity. However, Professor
Mandelker does not consider these costs nor the resulting conflict be-
tween various income groups. The increased cost of food accompa-
nying various programs of environmental land use preservation may
be of little consequence to affluent environmentalists already en-
joying haute cuisine, but it is of serious consequence to the less
affluent.
talLaw, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981) (arguing that the absence of a social utility function
should not preclude the consideration of non-economic values in some manner).
Even if one assumes that a societal utility function can be devised and does favor the
absolutist position, the second question must be addressed because different ways of imple-
menting a social choice have different efficiencies. See generaly R. STEWART & J. KRIER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 99-118 (2d ed. 1978). In particular, environmental
goods may result from a redefinition of property rights, subsidies, coercive edicts or financial
penalties. The method of intervention chosen will have a profound effect on the efficiency-
and as discussed in the text, the fairness-of any given resource allocation. While Professor
Mandelker addresses the fairness of some forms of government intervention, his absolute envi-
ronmental preference seriously slights the efficiency questions.
36 M.B. Johnson, Planning Without Pices. A Discussion of Land Use Regulation Without Com-
pensation, in PLANNING WrrHouT PRIcES 63-65 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
37 R. STEWART &J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 172 (2d ed. 1978). Ac-
cording to Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley, "to many of our nation's 20 million blacks,
the conservation movement has about as much appeal as a segregated bus. . . .Blacks gen-
erally regard ecology as irrelevant to their most pressing needs-jobs, housing, health care,
education." Bradley, Minorities and Conseroation, 57 Sierra Club Bull. 21 (No. 4 Apr. 1972).
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Initially, Professor Mandelker attempts to highlight not the con-
flict, but the common ground shared by environmentalists and low
income families. Both groups, he argues, "politicize the courts to rec-
ognize environmental and equity values. ' 38 In other words, both en-
vironmental advocates and opponents of exclusionary land use
controls (housing advocates) 39 seek to take the court beyond its role
as neutral decision maker by petitioning the court to implement their
respective social preferences. 40 However, to the extent that housing
advocates seek to invalidate exclusionary land use regulation on
equal protection grounds, any comparison to environmentalists pro-
moting a subjective value is simply false.
Professor Mandelker recognizes that "the federal courts [have]
concentrated on racially discriminatory, equal protection challenges
to exclusionary zoning."'4' However, the author attributes the
greater judicial solicitude for housing claims not to the constitutional
mandate but to the housing advocates' "assert[ion] of a minority,
rather than a majority, interest. '42 Professor Mandelker overlooks
the fact that environmental protection is advocated by an affluent
minority by claiming that environmental benefits are "widely en-
joyed." Thus, the author asserts it is the majoritarian character of
environmental interests which invites less judicial favor. The sleight-
of-hand, however, neither explains the different judicial treatment of
environmental and housing issues nor places them upon a common
footing. The fact remains that equal protection is grounded in the
constitution; the environment has not been granted constitutional
significance, except by precatory federal legislation 43 and a small
38 ENVIRONMENT at 55.
39 Developers are the most frequent housing advocates; however, potential housing con-
sumers have occasionally sought and been granted standing to challenge exclusionary land
use controls. Federal decisions on consumer standing are more restrictive than those applied
by most state courts. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denial of standing to
consumers and others without interest in specific project), with Southern Burlington Counsel
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808
(1975) (standing conferred on non-resident housing consumers without specific project inter-
ests). The New Jersey courts have expressly declined to follow the federal standing position
ennunciated in Warth. Home 'Builders League, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405
A.2d 281 (1979).
40 ENVIRONMENT at 56.
41 Id. at 58.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
For a strongly negative assessment of NEPA by a distinguished environmental scholar and
advocate, see Sax, The (Unhappy) Troh About NEPA, 26 OKtA. L. REV. 239 (1973). Professor
Sax indicates that NEPA is rooted in legal sentimentality, rather than in behavioral realities,
and suggests that environmentalists not "expect people to believe legislative declarations of
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number of state constitutional provisions, both of which are subject
to the supremacy clause.
Nevertheless, Professor Mandelker further strives to characterize
the interests of environmentalists and housing advocates as coinci-
dent, rather than divergent. He next argues that both groups bypass
the political process in favor of the judiciary because neither interest
commands a political or social consensus. 44 This argument contra-
dicts his claim that environmental protection is a widely-enjoyed
majoritarian value.45 Whatever Professor Mandelker means to say,
the same refutation applies: Housing advocates do not seek to cir-
cumvent the legislative process; rather, they seek to keep that process
within defined constitutional boundaries. Housing advocates do not
challenge the ability of a municipality to enact a land use program so
long as it is accomplished in a manner consistent with due process
and equal protection. From Professor Mandelker's description, this
clearly is not what environmentalists desire. The environmentalist
turns to the court not for protection of established property or eco-
nomic interests, or even for the fair treatment mandated by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments; instead, the environmentalists want the
court to create judicially what the legislature would not-some pro-
gram of environmental protection.
A few state courts have sought, under concepts of state equal
protection, to rewrite zoning provisions to provide for some unde-
fined fair share of low and moderate income housing.46 However, as
policy. The practical working rule is that what the legislature will fund is what the legisla-
ture's policy is." Id. at 248. For a comprehensive review of the impact of NEPA, see U.S.
COUNSEL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS EXPERIENCE By SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES (1976).
44 ENVIRONMENT at 57, 73.
45 On page 58, Professor Mandelker states: "The social interests asserted by litigants in
environmental and exclusionary zoning litigation differ. Environmentalists assert a
majoritarian interest in environmental protection." ENVIRONMENT at 58. However, Profes-
sor Mandelker later argues: "A reluctance to protect environmental and social values that
are not widely supported may lead courts to exercise caution when asked to recognize these
values in their decisions." Id. at 74.
46 In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336
A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), the court stated:
When it is shown that a developing municipality in its land use regulation has
not made realistically possible a variety and choice of housing, including adequate
provision to afford the opportunity for low and moderate income housing or has
expressly prescribed requirements or restrictions which preclude or substantially
hinder it, the facial showing of violation of substative due process or equal protec-
tion under the state constitution has been made out and the burden, and it is a
heavy one, shifts to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-
action.
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Professor Mandelker accurately reports, that effort has proved
largely unworkable. The courts which undertook the task are now
abandoning it. 47 Yet, it is important to stress what the author men-
tions only in passing-the federal courts48 and many state jurisdic-
tions have not chosen the path of judicial legislation to resolve land
use disputes. Invalidating the offending regulation is the most com-
mon form of judicial relief supplied by the federal and most states
courts in traditional land use matters. By contrast, Professor
Mandelker seeks more expansive judicial relief for environmentalists.
For example, when Professor Mandelker seeks review of a highway
which may be environmentally harmful, he wants the court first to
identify "polycentric variables" 49 and then to select the highway's
location based upon such factors as highway safety and wilderness
67 NJ. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728 (citation omitted). Once the burden shifts to the munici-
pality under these state court decisions, it cannot be satisfied, as it can in the federal courts,
by showing merely a permissable motivation or legislative policy objective. Rather, the mu-
nicipality must demonstrate an overriding governmental interest and specific means aimed at
achieving the overriding interest. For commentary on the "fair share" concept see Ackerman,
The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1;
Mallach, Do Law Suits Build Housing?" The Implications of Exclusionag, Zoning Litigation, 6 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 653 (1975); Rose, Exclusiona7 Zoning and Managed Growth; Some Unresolved Issues, 6
RUT.-CAM. LJ. 689 (1975).
Much of the commentary criticizes the notion of "fair share" for its ambiguity. In partic-
ular, after Mount Laurel, the government was left to ponder the extent of its duty to provide
housing for underserved population growths. See Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Manage-
ment and Exclusionav Zoning Issues, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 26 (Spring 1979).
47 ENVIRONMENT at 72. In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977), the New Jersey Supreme Court that developed the "fair share"
concept stated:
[ihe governmental-sociological-economical enterprise of seeing to the provision
and allocation throughout appropriate regions of adequate and suitable housing for
all categories of the population is much more appropriately a legislative and ad-
ministrative function rather than a judicial function to be exercised in the disposi-
tion of isolated cases.
72 NJ. at 534, 371 A.2d at 1218.
48 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a plaintiff challenging a land use decision as exclu-
sionary must demonstrate that a discriminatory purpose motivated it and that the govern-
mental entity would not have reached the same decision absent the impermissible purpose.
Id. at 270 & n.21.
However, lower federal courts have found that evidence of racial effect may constitute a
prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1052 (1975); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978).
49 See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CONTROLS 822 (1981).
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preservation. 50 As Professor Mandelker knows, courts undertake
such decisionmaking only if provided a clear legislative mandate or
decisional rule in favor of the environment. 51 While the arguments
against this type of judicial behavior need not be made again here,52
it is sufficient to note that judicial legislation is a difficult and per-
haps constitutionally improper role for the courts, and one which
housing advocates do not share with environmentalists.
If, in fact, environmentalists and housing advocates cannot see
eye-to-eye, how does Professor Mandelker mediate the conflict? He
simply characterizes housing advocacy as erroneous and suggests that
courts which respond to it are "one-sided. ' 53 For example, the au-
thor argues that opening up the suburbs separates low-income fami-
lies from jobs, undercuts the revitalization of inner cities, and fails to
increase significantly the housing stock available to low and moder-
ate income families. All these points are debatable. The large
number of day labor agencies in major metropolitan areas suggests
that a substantial profit is made transporting unskilled labor to the
suburbs for employment. 54 Second, the industrialization of the sub-
urbs and the industrial decline of the inner city parallel the popula-
tion growth of suburbs generally.5 5 Moreover, even as Professor
50 ENVIRONMENT at 64.
51 Id. at 65-66.
52 Professor H.L.A. Hart describes judicial legislation as the "nightmare" view of the
judiciary. See Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes.: The Nghtmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969, 972 (1977).
53 ENVIRONMENT at 99.
54 In addition to the distance and difficulty of reaching job opportunities in the suburbs,
suburban employment is often unavailable to low income or minority employees because of
lack of information and the employer's fear of local resentment. See Weaver, Housing and
Associated Problems of Minorities, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY 49, 61 (M. Clawson
ed. 1973). Weaver states: "An imposing body of literature asserts or documents that the
current development of employment opportunities outside the central cities and the concur-
rent restriction of housing opportunities for most non-whites in the suburbs result in a signifi-
cant reduction of non-white employment." Id. at 61.
55 Professor William Valente, a noted scholar of the local government process, states:
At present over half the SMSA [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area] popula-
tion lives in the suburbs, and by the end of this century, the majority of all Ameri-
cans will reside in the suburbs. . . . The movement is not all one way. Typically
the more affluent, mobile whites move to the suburbs while the aged, low income
and non-white groups move to and remain in the city. . . .Thus although the
black population group grew much faster than the white population in metropoli-
tan areas between 1960-1970, the percentage of blacks residing in suburbia has little
changed in recent years. The implications of such acute population disparities are
all too evident in our daily life. They pose critical challenges to the legal sys-
tem. ...
Economic resources are no longer concentrated in the core city or even in its
immediate suburb. They have been redistributed and deconcentrated throughout
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Mandelker's sources indicate, there is no shortage of suburban, un-
skilled jobs.56 Yet, without support, the author asserts that the
"growth in service and government employment has more than offset
the loss in industrial and retailing employment that has moved to the
suburbs. '57 Does Professor Mandelker seriously suggest that govern-
ment agencies, such as the EPA, are staffed by the unskilled workers
who lost their jobs when industrial concerns fled to the suburbs in
search of cheaper land, receptive zoning administrators, and assorted
tax incentives? In short, even if Professor Mandelker's statement that
losses in private, inner city employment are offset by increases in
service or government employment can be supported, this fact is
likely to be of little benefit to the low income, unskilled worker.
The revitalization of the inner city also probably benefits the
more affluent, rather than the low income, family. The process of
inner city neighborhood revitalization or "gentrification" displaces
low income tenants and owners in favor of in-migrants with higher
incomes sufficient to withstand the renovation cost needed to make
an inner city dwelling economically viable. Professor Mandelker's
comments in his well-edited volume on Housing In America: Problems
and Perspectives demonstrate that he realizes the effects of
gentrification:
Without substantial subsidies..., lower income households will be
"assigned" to neighborhoods in which the quality of housing will be
less than desirable. . . . The upfiltering of older dwellings . . .
seems likely to continue .... It will generate conflicts among
housing classes, particularly between low income and upper middle
class households as they compete in the same housing market.58
Thus, it is difficult to understand why opening up the suburbs to low
income families will defeat inner city redevelopment for the middle
class. If anything, the results should be precisely the opposite, since
allowing low income households to relocate in the suburbs increases
the supply of inner city structures available for revitalization.
Finally, purging the suburbs of exclusionary regulation should
the metropolitan region. Under new technologies the economic base for social
growth widened. Housing, retail and service industries follow the suburban mar-
ket. With convenient trucking and highways, more industries settle in dispersed
locations. The consequent relocation of job opportunities and related housing in
turn modify the tax base and service levels of each government unit.
W. VALENTE, LOcAL GOVERNMENT LAW 16-17 (2d ed. 1980).
56 ENVIRONMENT at 101 & n.11.
57 Id. at 81.
58 HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 353 (R. Montgomery & D.
Mandelker eds. 2d ed. 1979).
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also increase the amount of affordable housing for low and moderate
income households. This has been verified empirically by Professor
Bernard Siegan's study of land use without zoning in Houston. The
absence of zoning, and the artificial land scarcity zoning produces for
certain uses, has resulted in increased apartment construction and
lower rents.59 Moreover, even when the resulting new construction
directly benefits upper income families, an indirect benefit accrues to
lower income families when families with higher incomes place ex-
isting premises on the market and move into new structures.
Professor Mandelker denigrates this "filtering process" as "a
game of musical chairs" 60 and cautions that filtering will not work
"unless the housing that filters down declines more rapidly in price
than in quality. '61 He also suggests, curiously, that the suburban
housing made available "may not be better in quality than the hous-
ing they left."' 62 However, filtering has been studied extensively and
found to have dramatic secondary effects which benefit low income
families.63 For example, one study of the Chicago housing market
found that the construction of 482,000 new housing units between
1960 and 1970 resulted in "over 128,000 units [being] transferred
from white to black occupancy, [and] 63,000 of the worst units in the
city [being] demolished. ... 64 Moreover, the study revealed that
the increase in available housing and the resulting relocations pro-
duced a "substantial sag in demand in areas of traditional minority
residence. .. [and that] by 1972, blacks and other minorities were
paying less than the white majority for [like] housing .... "65
59 For the period 1966 to 1974, Professor Siegan estimated that Houston's rents were 15%
lower than those in Dallas. B. Siegan, Regulatlig The Use of Land, in THE INTERACTION OF
ECONOMICS AND LAw 159, 162-63 (B. Siegan ed. 1977). In 1980, a survey of apartment
rentals found that Houston had the lowest rent levels and the highest vacancy rate in any of
the country's most significant real estate markets. See 1 ETON, J. REAL EST. INVESTMENT 9
(Feb. - Mar. 1980).
60 ENVIRONMENT at 84.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., W. GRISBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963); J. LANSING,
NEW HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE (1969).
64 Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Famiy Housing Pn'c4 Chicago, 1968-72, 3 J. URs.
ECON. 397, 416 (1976).
65 Id. at 418. While Berry found that Chicago blacks were paying less than whites for
comparable housing, other investigations have been contrary. See, e.g., Schafer, RacialDiscrin-
ination in the Boston Housing Market, 6 J. URB. ECON. 176 (1979); Yinger, The Black-White Pice
Difterential in Housing: Some Further Evidence, 54 LAND EON. 187 (1978). The amount paid
may depend upon the size of the minority population in a given neighborhood. See J. MC-
DONALD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN URBAN HOUSING MARKET 54-61 (1979). Contrary to
Professor Mandelker's assertion, however, nothing suggests that the quality of the housing
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The conflict between environmental and housing interests is
real; it cannot be dismissed by creating an artificial common ground
based upon the procedural manner in which the issues are pursued or
on a pretense, contrary to available evidence, that somehow low and
moderate income families would be better off if the suburbs re-
mained closed to them. Restrictions which preserve open space,66 set
artificial limits on growth,67 create large minimum lot sizes,68 exact
park and other fees and place the cost of both new and existing pub-
lic facilities upon the developer 69 are nothing more than exclusionary
devices in environmental clothing.70 To be concerned about the fair-
which "filters down" is less than the quality of housing which would be available to low
income families if upper income construction did not occur.
66 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979), afd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). For a critical analysis of California's Open Space Land Act,
see Lefcoe, Calformia's LandPlanning Requirements. The Casefor Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
447 (1981).
67 See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,
430-35 (1977). Professor Ellickson states:
If demand for housing in Eden [a hypothetical suburb] is not perfectly elastic, that
suburb's exclusionary devices will raise the price of both new and used housing.
These price increases will reduce the surplus-ie., impair the welfare of four dis-
tinct groups of housing consumers. The two groups worst affected (in dollar terms)
will be: (1) current tenants who like Eden too much to want to move out (as they
will have to pay higher rents when they renew their leases); and (2) all households
that move into Eden in the future. These two groups will suffer a loss in surplus
equal to the full housing price increase. The remaining groups will lose less surplus.
They will consist of: (1) tenants who subsequently leave the municipality because
their rents go up; and (2) potential immigrants to Eden who have decided not to
buy or rent there simply because of the price increase caused by the antigrowth
policies.
Id. at 402.
68 See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERI-
CAN CITY 213-15 (1968).
69 See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of The Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). As the Associated case indicates,
few courts recognize the implicit "double taxation." But see West Park Ave., Inc. v. Towrship
of Odean, 48 NJ. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) in which the court stated:
But as to services which traditionally have been supported by general taxation,
other considerations are evident. The dollar burden would likely be unequal if new
homes were subjected to a charge in addition to the general tax rate. As to educa-
tion, for example, the vacant land has contributed for years to the cost of existing
educational facilities, and that land and the dwellings to be erected will continue to
contribute with all other real property to the payments of bonds issued for the
existing facilities and to the cost of renovating or replacing those facilities. Hence
there would be an imbalance if new construction alone were to bear the capital cost
of new schools while being also charged with the capital costs of schools serving
other portions of the school district.
48 N.J. at 126-27, 224 A.2d at 3-4.
70 See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of The Whole World?,
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ness to remote future generations of environmental degradation with-
out fully recognizing the housing sacrifice which that concern
requires of present generations, seems highly inequitable.
B. Property Rights and Environmental Protection
In light of Professor Mandelker's treatment of housing advo-
cates, it is not surprising that he finds little merit in the compensation
claims of landowners whose property values have been greatly dimin-
ished by environmental land use regulation. Professor Mandelker as-
serts, without substantial elaboration, that taking cases do not
implement fairness values. 7' In view of the substantial scholarship
which the author expressly declines to consider, 72 but which has
found compensation to be central to a fair land use allocation system,
the assertion is unsupportable.
In his groundbreaking work on the taking issue, Professor
Michelman indicated that fairness considerations largely determine
whether the opportunity costs accompanying economic regulation
for the benefit of society should be imposed solely upon landowners
or redistributed. 73 For example, Professor Michelman concluded
that compensation should be paid whenever the cost of landowner
demoralization, which might impede future investment and produc-
tion, exceeds the cost of settling the compensation claim. Impor-
tantly, Professor Michelman recognized that fairness required
compensation even though a given regulation may be deemed other-
wise beneficial or efficient. 74 Others have reached similar conclu-
sions-perhaps even the Supreme Court. Writing for four, and
1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 234 (1973); Blumstein, A Prolegomenon To Growth Management and Exclu-
sionag Zoning Issues, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 36 (1979).
71 ENVIRONMENT at 63.
72 Professor Mandelker expressly declines to consider the ethical view of the taking clause
espoused by Professor Michelman with the unenlightening assertion that "it is unlikely that
compensation systems are one of the basic structures of society .... " ENVIRONMENT at 54
n.40. Contra, Michelman, Propery, Utiliy and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of' ust
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTYAND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Berger, A Poliy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 165 (1974); Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use.- An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1981); Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Waite,
Govemmental Power and Pn'vate Properly, 16 OATH. U.L. REV. 283 (1967).
73 Michelman, Properl, Utility, andFairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 'rust Com-
pensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
74 Professor Michelman states:
It follows that if, for any measure, both demoralization costs and settlement costs
(whichever were chosen) would exceed efficiency gains, the measure is to be re-
jected; but that otherwise, since either demoralization costs or settlement costs must
be paid, it is the lower of these two costs which should be paid. The compensation
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possibly five, members of the Court in San Diego Gas &Electric v. City
of San Diego,75 Justice Brennan noted:
This Court has consistently recognized that the just compensation
requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory--once there
is a "taking," compensation must be awarded. . .. [The Just Com-
pensation] guarantee was designed to bar the government from
forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fairness,
should be borne by the public as a whole.76
Justice Brennan's opinion not only underscores the fairness concern
in taking cases, but also reaffirms Professor Michelman's observation
that a given land use regulation may be found confiscatory even if it
promotes efficiency or is deemed socially desirable. Modern land use
text books also emphasize this general principle. 77 Nevertheless, Pro-
fessor Mandelker reaches an opposite conclusion and states: "[courts]
review the justification for the land-use control and uphold controls
that impose an involuntary loss to accomplish an acceptable public
purpose.178
Apart from the fairness issue, Professor Mandelker finds no rea-
son to mitigate the wipeouts (regulatory losses) and recoup the wind-
falls (regulatory gains) associated with environmental, and perhaps
rule which then clearly emerges is that compensation is to be paid whenever settle-
ment costs are lower than both demoralization costs and efficiency gains.
Id. at 1215. Demoralization costs include the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which
accrue to losers and sympathizers and the lost value of future production. Settlement costs
are measured by the dollar value of time, effort and resources necessary to reach compensa-
tion settlements. Professor Michelman places his fairness test somewhat upon a utilitarian
base. He states:
What we want to know, then, is whether a specific decision not to compensate
is fair. By the very asking of the question we adopt the vantage point of a disap-
pointed claimant and assume on his part a capacity (a) to appraise his treatment
and calculate his advantage over a span of time (that is, he is not without patience)
and (b) to view the particular decision in question as a specific manifestation of a
general practice which will be applied consistently to situations involving other
people.
4 decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the disappointed claimant
ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent prac-
tice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any
consistent practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision.
Id. at 1221-23.
75 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
76 Id. at 1305-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77 R. C. ELICKSON & A. D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 98 (1981). Professor El-
lickson states: "An important feature of suits involving confiscatory zoning is this: a landowner
may be entitled to preail on a claim that a zoning clsifwcation ir unconstitutionallv confiscatoy even though
the court ir convinced that the classifration is e tient." Id.
78 ENviRONMENT at 15.
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all, land use regulation. First, he suggests that windfalls will not nec-
essarily equal wipeouts and that "the transaction costs of determin-
ing their incidence and levying a windfall tax are substantial. ' 79 In
addition, Mandelker argues, the prospect of a windfall or wipeout is
factored into land prices, and hence, need not concern government
regulators.80 Finally, he suggests that indifference to losses and gains
in the land market may be the position of the Supreme Court based
upon its Penn Central decision.81
Mandelker's theory appears to be an attempted refutation of
Professor Hagman's comprehensive analysis of land value capture
and compensation. 2 Professor Hagman advocates windfall recap-
ture and wipeout mitigation because he recognizes that the existing
land use system is not a rationally planned, predictable system capa-
ble of reasonable valuation in land prices.83 The large number of
zone amendments and variances granted annually without standards
or adherence to announced standards speaks for itself.84 Professor
Hagman rightly argues that the existing system is no more than a
lottery, where "who gets the goodies and who gets deprived will be
perceived as arbitrary and capricious.185 Additionally, a system
which has the capacity for conferring enormous windfalls and
equally staggering wipeouts invites corruption and bribery, whether
in the form of illegal "under the table" payments or legal campaign
contributions.86 Furthermore, it transforms the land development
process into a high risk enterprise with fewer individuals willing to
invest or undertake long-term, high quality projects in fear of unpre-
79 Id. at 49.
80 Id. at 50-51.
81 Id. at 51. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
82 WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (D.
Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI].
83 Hagman, Wi'ndfallsfor Wopeouts, in HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, supra note 82, at 20-21.
84 See, e.g., Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Stud in Mis-
rule, 50 KY. LJ. 273 (1962); Shapiro, The Zonzig Vanrwme Power - Constructive in Theogi, Destruc-
tive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3 (1969); Note, The Efect of Statutoy Prerequisites on Decisions of
Boards of Zoning Appeals, I IND. LEGAL F. 398 (1968).
85 Hagman, Windfallsfor W4i7eouts, in HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, supra note 82, at 20, 21.
86 Seegenerall5y J. GARDINER & T. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR SALE: CORRUPTION AND RE-
FORM IN LAND-USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978). A recently completed two-year
study sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice found
local government corruption in land use and building regulation to be a significant problem
in many areas of the United States. The study found that land use decisions were particularly
susceptible to corruption because of the significant financial losses and gains imposed as a
consequence of zoning. See SRI INT'L, CORRUPTION IN LAND USE AND BUILDING REGULA-
TIONS AND AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING REFORMS: MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVE FOR CORRUP-
TION (Dept. of Justice, 1979).
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dictable regulatory changes.8 7
As to Professor Mandelker's specific objections, Professor
Hagman would be the first to admit that the recapture of windfalls
may be costly when the windfalls are dispersed. As part of his omni-
bus proposal, Professor Hagman states that "small windfalls should
not be recaptured to save administrative costs. . . because it is hard
to measure them very precisely." 88 Thus, Hagman suggests that
windfalls and wipeouts below a flat sum or less than 10 percent of the
property's base value be accumulated until they exceed a de minimis
amount.
That a particular land use regulation may produce a greater
wipeout than windfall or vice versa hardly comes as a surprise, and it
suggests that the efficiency claims (i.e., purported economic benefits)
for much land use regulation are overstated. Professor Hagman
never assumed that these amounts would be equal.89 Hagman pro-
poses a comprehensive recapture of publicly and privately produced
windfalls and wipeouts; thi proposal is not regulation-specific as is
Professor Mandelker's criticism. Therefore, an imbalance between
the particular windfalls and wipeouts created by a given coastal zone
regulation does not, as Mandelker proclaims, indicate that "the cap-
ture of windfall gains to compensate wipeout losses cannot solve the
taking problem." 9 After all, that Peter robs Paul and wastes the
money does not mean that either Peter should go unpunished or Paul
uncompensated.
Professor Mandelker's use of coastal zone regulation to illustrate
87 Professor Hagman recommends that we "stop imposing great risk on landownership
and its development, as if it were the most free of enterprises, and instead neutralize the risk
somewhat by minimizing downside losses and socializing upside gains." Hagman, supra note
83, at 20, 24.
88 Hagman & Misczynski, Recommendations, in HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, sufira note 82, at
59-60.
89 Professor Hagman remarks:
Under a rational system of land use controls,... [w]indfalls might roughly equal
wipeouts on the theory that the price of land is largely determined by the demand
for it. If land use controls prohibit a demand from finding a supply in a particular
place, the demand is shunted elsewhere ...
However, under the 'byzantine". . . system of land use control in America,
wipeouts may exceed windfalls. Developers must spend money learning the ropes
and shepherding their projects through the chambers. Windfalls (which might
otherwise be recaptured) are whittled away by administrative costs. Similarly, be-
cause of the bubbling cacophony of multitudinous edicts, it is unclear where the
supply is. The demand goes around searching for it, the search being another high
administrative cost.
Hagman, Windfals for Wipeouls, in HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, sura note 82, at 20.
90 ENVIRONMENT at 49.
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the "dynamic view of windfalls and wipeouts"9 1 and to justify soci-
ety's indifference to them is ironic in view of the significant economic
waste imposed by such regulation in practice. For example, in Avco
Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission,92 a land-
owner was denied a coastal permit to complete a residential develop-
ment in a California coastal zone after it had installed over two
million dollars in improvements in reliance upon other permits issued
pursuant to zoning, subdivision and other traditional land use con-
trols. As one scholar commented, such results leave no one better off
since land is left in a partially developed state, neither environmen-
tally nor economically viable.93
Professor Mandelker inadequately deals with the question of
when a right to develop "vests." He concentrates solely on losses in
land value due to coastal regulation, not losses of the Avco variety
associated with landowner improvement. By focusing upon land
value losses which he maintains are "created by speculation against
the coastal land-use regulation program,' 94 he is able to conclude
that "[r]ational buyers in land markets should internalize the effect
of land-use regulation in their pricing decisions. '95  Professor
Mandelker does not reveal whether he would recognize losses where
improvements are constructed prior to a change or implementation
of environmental land use regulation. If environmental protection is
the absolute value he suggests, perhaps landowners must come to ex-
pect-if they have not already-that a governmental agency may
regulate at will and impose almost any loss it pleases.
In discussing Professor Mandelker's conclusion that landowners
should not be compensated for regulatory losses, we must not lose
sight of the effect a noncompensatory regulatory policy has on hous-
ing consumers and the exclusionary issues referred to previously.
While the economic incidence of regulatory burdens is difficult to
trace, some evidence suggests that the cost of regulation is passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices, especially where demand is
relatively inelastic. 96
91 Id.
92 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
93 Hagman, The Vesting Issue.- The Rights of Fetal Development vis-a-vi The Abortions of Public
Whimrug, 7 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 519, 532 (1977).
94 ENVIRONMENT at 50, 51.
95 Id. at 54 & n.44.
96 See generaly U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FINAL REPORT OF
THE TAx FORCE ON HousING COSTS 35 (May 1978). But see Misczynski, The Question of
Incidence, in HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, sufira note 82, at 127-28.
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In addition, some environmental land use controls may not only
be exclusionary, but also anti-environmental. For example, regula-
tion which promotes preservation may prevent the dispersion of auto
and stationary source pollution that results in net air quality benefits
over concentrated development. 97 Thus, Professor George Lefcoe has
concluded that the California Open Space Lands Act,98 which re-
quires the preparation of an open space element within a general
plan, results only in making homesites with better air quality "more
expensive, thus placing them even farther from the reach of people
whose means are limited. . . ."99 But pollution is another problem
which Professor Mandelker sets aside to proclaim the need for abso-
lute environmental protection. Although the author suggests that
controlling environmental pollution "presents conceptual problems
similar to the land-use control problems [he does] consider,"' 00 he
fails to elaborate. I suspect that the pollution problem involves equi-
table conflicts similar to those raised by housing advocates and land-
owners, whose concerns have been characterized as inferior to the
subjective environmental ethic-the fundamental nature of which
has not been established. I seriously doubt whether a book which
leaves these equitable conflicts undiscussed and unresolved, and fos-
ters others by advocating resource choices that impede economic pro-
ductivity to the deprivation of all-but especially the less well-off-
can rightly be entitled Environment and Equity. I vote for striking the
last two words.
The votes of the Supreme Court in its recent consideration of
the taking issue in San Diego also indicate that the Court will likely
come down on the side of equity. 10 Contrary to Professor
Mandelker's representation, the Court can reasonably be construed
97 Keyes, Channeling Metropolitan Growth: In What Direction, Toward Which End? 43 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 247-48 (Spring 1979).
98 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65560-65570 (West Supp. 1980).
99 Lefoe, Califormia's Land Planning Requirements: The Care for Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 447, 471-72 (1981). Pollution is thereby concentrated in areas inhabited primarily by
lower income groups, decreasing the air quality enjoyed by these people.
100 ENVIRONMENT at xii.
101 While the supposed absence of a final judgment in the decision below prevented the
Court from reaching a decision, Justice Brennan's dissent for himself and three members of
the qourt strongly favored the payment of compensation upon the finding of a regulatory
taking. In addition, while Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion which found
the absence of a final judgment, he stated that had there been a final judgment, he "would
have little difficulty agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan." San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1294 (1981). See
Kmiec, Regulatofv Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L. -
(1982).
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as having already recognized the need for compensation for overzeal-
ous regulation in Penn Central. Admittedly, the Court's terminology is
uncertain,10 2 and hardly generous to the landowner, insofar as it
makes diminutions in value due to contemplated uses virtually non-
compensable. Nevertheless, the decision constitutionally secures the
economic viability of some existing use. In contrast, even though
Professor Mandelker is not totally clear on his treatment of existing
uses destroyed by environmental regulation, he appears to argue that
all losses due to regulation be disregarded. A position of total
noncompensation goes beyond the meager property protection sup-
plied by the Court's compensation of reasonable "investment backed
expectations."10 3 In fact, it effectively repeals the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment.
III. The Conflict Between Absolute Environmental Protection
and Democratic Government
Finally, a good portion of Professor Mandelker's book criticizes
state constitutional or statutory enactments designed to protect the
environment and the manner in which these pronouncements have
been interpreted by the courts and implemented by administrative
agencies.1 0 4 Professor Mandelker observes:
The polycentric nature of environmental land-use controversies
complicates the ability of courts and legislatures to apply environ-
mental priorities to land-use conflicts. Policy making for polycen-
tric controversies requires a compromise of competing values.
Courts recognize that this compromise requires a policy decision
best left to the legislature. Legislative bodies, in turn, avoid poli-
cymaking by decentralizing the land-use decision-making
process. 1 0 5
This observation is well-documented by Professor Mandelker's exam-
ination of the coastal zone management process and the judicial re-
view of environmental impact statements.
The impetus for management of the coastal zone derived from
federal legislation106 that established a grant program to assist states
in developing and operating management programs for their land
102 Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionaq Zoning Issues, 43 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 88-89 & n.606 (1979). See also, Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alterna-
tive Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1981).
103 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
104 ENVIRONMENT at 107-57.
105 Id. at 155-56.
106 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
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and water resources. With a federal grant, states were expected to
survey coastal areas, define permitted uses in their coastal zones and
identify how the state proposed to exert control over coastal land and
water uses-matters which are normally regulated locally.
As Mandelker notes, the coastal act reveals the environmental-
ist's distrust of local land-use planning and control. 10 7 The distrust
results largely from local decisionmakers' failure to give the environ-
ment an absolute priority. The coastal act was designed partially to
circumvent competing local interests by requiring coastal manage-
ment programs directly or indirectly enforceable on the state level.
Unfortunately for the absolutists, few states mandated specific
coastal protections. Instead, state legislatures enacted coastal depen-
dency policies, which required that any development within a coastal
zone depend upon that location. While such policies might be con-
strued strictly in favor of the environment, neither the federal act nor
state guidelines mandated explicit favoritism. Consequently, the
coastal dependency issue became a modified cost-benefit test, under
which state and local decisionmakers conducted "a comparative
evaluation of economic costs and benefits of a coastal, as compared
with an inland, location."' 08 That evaluation seldom resulted in
preservation of the coast. At best, it resulted in the shifting of some
coastal development inland, which may or may not be environmen-
tally beneficial.' 0 9 At worst, the evaluation resulted in a significant
"dead weight" administrative cost which netted neither housing nor
industry nor preservation.
Professor Mandelker also finds the congressional declaration in
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that "each person
should enjoy a healthful environment"'10 to be something less than
absolute environmental protection. The requirement that all major
107 ENVIRONMENT at 156.
108 Id. at 141.
109 Professor Hagman observes:
There may be less saving of environmental degradation than first meets the eye
[associated with coastal regulation and a late vesting rule]. For example, suppose a
developer was considering a coastal development but was unwilling to risk failure
to vest. Demand not being reduced, the developer would shift the provision of a
supply of development elsewhere. While that elsewhere would not be on the coast,
it might well be on other environmentally senstitive lands-lake frontages, moun-
tains, agricultural plains, forested areas, areas rich in natural resources that cannot
then be mined.
Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights ofFetal Development vis-a-vis the Abortions of Public Whimsy,
7 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 520, 531-32 (1977).
110 ENVIRONMENT at 107 (citing § 101(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1976)).
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federal actions significantly affecting the environment be accompa-
nied by an environmental impact statement (EIS) originates with
NEPA. However, the EIS requirement, like the coastal-dependency
inquiry, is just another cost-benefit test which requires that agencies
consider the environment, but not accord it priority.11 Moreover,
judicial precedent concerning the adequacy of the environmental al-
ternatives presented by a given EIS suggests that development oppo-
nents have some burden to show that "sufficient [evidence] requires
reasonable minds to inquire further."' 1 2 Professor Mandelker be-
moans this judicial interpretation as one which "weakens an agency's
obligation to consider alternatives.""13 Again, this observation is
consistent with Mandelker's central thesis that environmental values
are subjective and incapable of objective proof. Apparently, requir-
ing environmental absolutists to justify their demands for prolonged
administrative review of "every possible alternative, no matter how
uncommon or unknown" is too "restrictive"'1 4 for Professor
Mandelker.
Professor Mandelker echoes these same themes in his examina-
tion of state constitutional provisions that favor the environment.
Generally, state court decisions have interpreted these provisions as
procedural, calling for a balancing of environmental interests with
the competing concerns of housing or employment. That these con-
stitutional provisions have been interpreted as requiring in part that
"any development demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the en-
vironmental invasion to a minimum,"'1 5 is simply not enough for an
absolutist because it means that the environment is not always fa-
vored; and even when it is, it is not favored absolutely.
Not surprisingly, Professor Mandelker concludes from his study
that the American "legal system does not accept the subjective envi-
ronmental priorities implicit in protective environmental con-
trols."' 1 6 What is surprising is his recognition that the demand for
absolute environmental protection "cut[s] against the grain of Ameri-
III Id. at 119.
112 Id. at 122 (discussing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519
(1978) (the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the NRDC not to reopen a nuclear power
plant licensing proceeding to consider an energy conservation alternative which had not been
urged until the licensing process had been completed)). See generaly Rogers, A Hard Look at
Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO..L.J. 699 (1979).
113 ENVIRONMENT at 125.
114 Id. at 122.
115 Id. at 115.
116 Id. at 154.
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can governmental tradition." 1 7 He acknowledges that our govern-
ment is one of limited powers designed to maximize individual
freedom and accommodate more than "one-dimensional values, like
environmental protection, that do not enjoy full public support."' 18
I agree totally, but find this conclusion rather curious coming from a
commentator who previously was indifferent to the competing claims
for employment and economic productivity, the importance of open-
ing up the suburbs to low income families, and the regulatory losses
of landowners. Suddenly, the environmentalists for Professor
Mandelker become "they" not "we". He suggests that "they must
overcome political resistance and convince policymakers that the
values they hold deserve the legal protection they claim." 19 This is
rather -like Tonto telling the Lone Ranger in the final scene, and in
the face of impending attack, that he supported the Indians all along.
Well, no matter. Environmental protection is not an absolute,
fundamental priority, and I seriously doubt whether Professor
Mandelker's luke-warm advocacy will make it so. In any case where
social and economic claims conflict, environmental protection will be
only as important as the scientific, moral, and legal arguments made
in its behalf. Environmental benefits must be tangible and clearly
demonstrated; they cannot be assumed to be fundamental. After all,
to accord animal and plant life absolute protection would be too
much to expect of a society which has yet to do the same for human
life.120
117 Id. at 157.
118 Id. at 155.
119 Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
120 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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